Marc-Arthur Diaye, André Lapidus 02.12.2008 -23:51 2 (b). R. Sugden doubts that Hume uses preferences "in the same way that modern theorists do", but he seems to have fewer doubts that desires in the Treatise can be interpreted as a choice function C(.) from the domain of choice F into the set of non-empty subsets of the set of choice X. Still, as a consequence of Hume considering desire and will the last step before the carrying out of action, this position seems difficult to maintain.
It is well-known that, according to Hume, desire is related to pleasure, not in the sense that the intensity of an impression of pleasure is reflected by the intensity of the desire for an object, but because the intensity of the idea of this impression (which Hume calls a "belief"; see, for example, THN I: 96 1 ) is expressed in a desire. Desires hence appear at first to be evaluative rather than comparative. But leaving aside all other considerations, it is trivial to conclude that if desire provides an evaluation which is a transformation of the intensity of pleasure, it also allows a comparison, through a binary relation that we can acknowledge as a relation of preference. In our paper, we have thus represented desires by preference relations.
Still closer to action, the will ("the internal impression we feel, and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind"; THN II: 399) does not express anything other than the consequence of comparison that desires draw in a context of choice. We have then considered that preferences and choice respectively refer to desire and will, and that for each context S, choices C(S) are locally rationalisable by a local relation of preference R S .
Since it remains local (that is, the preference relations might be contradictory between two different local contexts of choice, S 1 and S 2 ), this result should of course not be overestimated: from a Humean point of view, it only means that when facing such context S, we always choose what we prefer within this context.
Admitting that a theory of choice may be derived from Hume's theory of action as a special case, both standard choice theory and developments from the Treatise or the Dissertation devoted to desire and will give sense to the idea that a Humean choice process is grounded on choice functions and on preference relations.
A Humean restatement of Sugden's rationality criterion
There is therefore no major objection to reformulating Sugden's question in his comment: does Hume's theory of choice imply the existence of a choice function rationalisable by a preference relation? Answering such a question first led Sugden to bring to the fore a methodological criterion: rationality is disconfirmed when its causal explanation is rejected as a justification -that is, when there is no possibility of rescuing the theory by individuating the objects more finely. This criterion is most interesting, but rather puzzling, for it might be argued that a Humean approach leaves no room for such a separation between "causal explanation" and "justification". Yet it might also be considered to (c). Following Hume, since choice, as a special case of action, is determined by our passionate investment directed towards an object -a desire -concerning which we have a belief that it is able to cause the satisfaction of this desire, its justification (the couple desire-belief) is itself the causal explanation. On second thoughts, however, Sugden's methodology might be considered a nonHumean echo to the conditions for a revision of what Hume called "our general resolutions" (EPM: 239), in the context of a passionate process. Such a revision in our general resolutions is a possible consequence of the "double relation" (THN II: 282-4; DP: 144-5), of ideas, and of impressions (R.
Sugden favours the relation of ideas; but this could be extended without difficulty) which constitutes, beside external perceptions, the endogenous engine of the Humean dynamics of passions.
This dynamics of passions concerns the transformation of a mental state, characterised by some desires and will, into another mental state, characterised by possibly different desires and will. We have recalled above why we have, on the one hand, linked desires and will, and on the other hand, preferences and choice. However, R. Sugden's doubt that Hume uses preferences in the same way as "modern theorists" is well-founded. But the difference with "modern theorists" does not lie in preferences as such, which should not be rejected from the analysis, but with the set over which they are defined. In keeping with Hume, objects cannot be considered, in our minds, pre-existent data over which a binary relation of preference is defined: rather, they are constructed by our desires (see, for instance, Hume's discussion in THN II: 414). Other objects could exist for other agents or for an external observer, but for the agent who does not desire them, they simply do not exist. Moreover, when an agent desires such object, bringing this object into existence also entails the description under which it is perceived -a description which might differ substantially from that which another agent, or an external observer, might have adopted. This question of description is crucial. What Sugden considers a case of non-rationality corresponds to a passionate process in which the agent's description of objects comes with a change in his or her general resolutions, that is, in his or her preferences. On the contrary, when the agent's description fits into his or her general resolutions, his or her preferences are not submitted to any revision, and his or her choice may be called "rational" according to Sugden's methodology.
(d).
Let us hence consider the following two choices: {x} = C (S 1 ) over S 1 = {x, y} {y} = C (S 2 ) over S 2 = {x, y, z} These choices clearly violate Sugden's contraction consistency condition (Sen's property α), so that no general preference relation over X = {x, y, z} can rationalise the choice function. But, as Sugden acknowledges, rationality could be rescued by "individuating options more finely". A well-known example, drawn from Amartya Sen (1993: 501), might help make this point clearer. Suppose that x, y and z denote three slices of cake, the sizes of which vary in increasing order from x to y and from y to z. We may then encounter two types of situations:
1. Suppose I am well-mannered, and that I do not want to pick the largest slice, though I am very fond of this cake: this justification for my choices C (S 1 ) and C (S 2 ) meets the alleged causal explanation for my behaviour, and, according to Sugden's criterion, I am rational.
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Marc are such that they express local preferences over S 1 ' and S 2 ' which can be considered to be restrictions over S 1 ' and S 2 ' of the same general preference relation R defined over X = S 1 ' ∪ S 2 ' = {a, b, c}. These choices are then evidently rational, in the sense that the preference relation R rationalises the choice function C(.). In other terms, my "general resolutions" need not be changed and do not contradict any local preferences, precisely as is the case in our paper, when preferences are not submitted to revision.
2'. My appetite, though moderate, is the only guide for my desires. So that the slices of cakes appear to me under a description which favours their size: over S 1 ' (resp. over S 2 ') I have to choose between x and y (resp. x, y, and z) defined as above. But if {x} = C (S 1 ') and {y} = C (S 2 '), my general resolutions have to be changed, as in D-PROC, in our paper, when preferences are revised. For instance, facing S 2 ', I could say: "Well, after all, these slices are not so big and I am beginning to feel a little hungry. Suppose that S 1 ' is again offered to me, I now choose {y}, and evidently not {x}".
Rationality as a possible outcome of choice
Up until this point, our disagreement with Robert Sugden should not be overstated, and neither the elimination of preferences nor the introduction of a non-Humean methodological criterion of rationality seriously threaten the kind of lesson that, as economists, we can draw from Hume's theory of passions. Accordingly, his sturdy opposition, expressed in the very title of his paper -"rationality may not be a consequence…" -which aims at closing the path that we have cautiously opened in our own title -"rationality may be one consequence…" -should rest on other grounds. These last concern (e) the interpretation of Hume, and (f) the place of rationality in the theory of choice. 5 choices non-rational, like in situation 2 above. But Hume never claimed that the engine of the dynamics of passion that he tried to explain would lead to a sort of mental chaos: preferences do not simply change along the passionate process, they are revised and adapted. We have therefore tried to grasp Hume's few intuitions concerning this transformation. And it is on the basis of these intuitions that we have shown in proposition 1 that the updating process displayed in D-PROC led at any step to a rational choice, in the sense of a compatibility between choices and general preferences -that is, which would fulfil Sugden's conditions of contraction and expansion. In the same way, we have drawn on Hume's suggestion of the existence of some kind of stabilization of the emotions so as to show (proposition 2) that D-PROC led to complete and transitive preferences.
Of course, Hume never explicitly assumed something like preordered preferences. But his depiction of a standard functioning of our mind brings about rationality as an outcome of this functioning.
(f). Obviously, Sugden's view of the place of rationality differs from ours. In several important papers previously published, he sees rationality as a property of some specific situations, which is not shared by other situations. For instance, referring to Sen's well-known sporting metaphor which illustrates condition α ("if the word champion in some game is a Pakistani, then he must also be the champion in Pakistan" (Sen 1970: 17) ), he argued that in other situations, like in interactive sporting championships, minimal consistency requirements 1 no longer prevail (Sugden 1985: 169-71) . A consequence is that, although rationality does not become meaningless, there is no evidence that it should keep its privileged position as a standard in the assessment of choice. In contrast, we view rationality as a property which may be displayed by our minds in the process of building our world.
This clearly excludes any fetishistic approach to rationality. But since it is linked to some regularity in the functioning of our minds, it also constitutes a reference to appreciate any departure from this regularity.
One needs no more than an emphasis laid on the positive aspects of Hume's theory of passion, along with a conception of rationality as an expression of our mind to open the path to this modest statement: rationality may be a consequence of a Humean theory of choice.
